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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

GREGORY BENDAU,

Plaintiff,

V.

SEQUOIA ONE PEO, LLC;
CEREBRAL MEDICAL GROUP, A
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION;
CEREBRAL MEDICAL GROUP, PA
fka SOUTH LEMON PROVIDER
GROUP, PA; and DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive.

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:21-cv-09580-TLT

CLASS ACTION

**PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION
AND MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF
CLASS ACTION AND PAGA
SETTLEMENT**

Honorable Trina L. Thompson
Courtroom: 9, 19th Floor

Date: May 16, 2023
Time: 2:00 p.m.
Courtroom: 9

Complaint Filed: December 10, 2021
Trial Date: None Yet Set

1 **TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF
2 RECORD:**

3 **PLEASE TAKE NOTICE** that on May 16, 2023, at 2:00 p.m. in the above-
4 entitled court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, Plaintiff Gregory
5 Bendau (“Plaintiff”) will move the Court for an Order granting preliminary
6 approval of the proposed class action settlement between Plaintiff and Cerebral
7 Medical Group, PC and Cerebral Medical Group, PA (“Defendants” or “Cerebral”)
8 (Plaintiff and Defendant are referred to collectively as the “Parties”). The settlement
9 is memorialized in the Parties’ “binding agreement” titled “Memorandum of
10 Understanding”, submitted herewith as Exhibit A.¹ which is not replaced by the
11 Parties’ executed long-form settlement agreement attached as Exhibit E to the
12 Supplemental Declaration of Katherine J. Odenbreit. (“Settlement Agreement” or
13 “Agreement”)

14 The Parties will further move the Court for an Order:

15 1. Certifying for settlement purposes the following classes:

- 16 a. Provider Class: all persons who were employed by
17 Cerebral in California as a non-exempt employee with the
18 job title of Associate Therapist, Care Counselor, Licensed
19 Therapist (NE), Prescriber, Therapist Associate (NE) or
Therapist Nonexempt any time between December 10,
2017 and September 28, 2022.
- 21 b. Vacation Class Member: means all former employees of
22 Cerebral who were either (a) employed by Cerebral in
23 California as a salaried exempt employee on or after
January 1, 2021; or (b) employed by Cerebral in California
24 as a non-exempt employee on or after August 15, 2021 and
classified as benefits eligible by Cerebral at any time
25 between August 15, 2021 and September 28, 2022.

26 ¹ The MOU states in its first paragraph: “This document is a binding agreement. The parties shall enter
27 into a final written Settlement Agreement, the provisions of which shall not be materially inconsistent
28 with this document.” However, during the entire time since Plaintiff sent to Defendant a draft of a “final
Settlement Agreement” on January 12, 2023, Defendants failed to cooperate or even communicate their
contributions to it. Thus, Plaintiff had to file the present motion in order to comply with the Court’s
deadline for filing a motion for preliminary approval,

- 1 2. Preliminarily approving Settlement;
- 2 3. Appointing Plaintiff as Class Representative for settlement purposes;
- 3 4. Appointing Plaintiff's counsel, Kevin Mahoney and Katherine
- 4 Odenbreit of MAHONEY LAW GROUP, APC and Ira Spiro, as Class
- 5 Counsel for settlement purposes;
- 6 5. Approving Phoenix Class Action Administrators as Settlement
- 7 Administrators;
- 8 6. Approving the form and content of the Class Notice, and directing the
- 9 mailing of same;
- 10 7. Approving the opt-out and objection procedures provided in the
- 11 Settlement Agreement and set forth in the Notice of Settlement;
- 12 8. Directing Defendants to furnish the Settlement Administrator within
- 13 fifteen (15) business days after the Court grants preliminary approval
- 14 of the Settlement the Class Data, defined as: , Class Member
- 15 identifying information in Cerebral's possession including the Class
- 16 Member's name, last-known mailing address, Social Security number,
- 17 email address not exclusively in any Defendant's electronic
- 18 communication system, and number of Class Period Workweeks and
- 19 PAGA Pay Periods, an indication of whether the individual qualifies
- 20 as a member of the Vacation Class during the Class Period and/or
- 21 PAGA Period, and the number of pay periods the individual qualified
- 22 as a member of the Provider Class during the PAGA Period. and
- 23 9. Setting a Final Approval Hearing.

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The motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and authorities, the Declarations of Katherine Odenbreit and Ira Spiro concurrently filed herewith, the records and files in this action, and any other further evidence or argument that the Court may properly receive at or before the hearing.

Date: May 1, 2023

By: Katherine J. Odenbreit
MAHONEY LAW GROUP, APC
IRA SPIRO, ATTORNEY AT LAW
Kevin Mahoney
Katherine J. Odenbreit
Ira Spiro
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Gregory Bendau

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1 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

2 **I. INTRODUCTION**

3 On February 6, 2023 Plaintiff filed his Motion for Preliminary Approval of
 4 Settlement as directed by the Court’s order dated January 3, 2023 (ECF Dkt. No.
 5 43.) As of February 6, 2023, Plaintiff did not have a final executed long-form
 6 settlement agreement and therefore submitted the Parties’ Memorandum of
 7 Understanding attached as Exhibit A to the Declaration of Katherine J. Odenbreit
 8 (See ECF Dkt. No. 44-1², ¶6, Exhibits A and D.) The Parties have since finalized the
 9 long-form settlement agreement. (“Settlement Agreement”) A true and correct copy
 10 of the executed long-form settlement agreement is attached hereto as **Exhibit E** to
 11 the Supplemental Declaration of Katherine J. Odenbreit (“Odenbreit Supp. Dec.”),
 12 filed concurrently herewith. This Amended Motion only modifies the citations to the
 13 Settlement Agreement and is otherwise the same as ECF Dkt. No. 44 filed on
 14 February 6, 2023. (Odenbreit Supp. Dec., ¶4.)

15 Plaintiff is a former non-exempt employee of Cerebral with a job often
 16 referred to by Cerebral as “Provider.” He worked for Cerebral in California between
 17 March 16, 2021 to May 28, 2021. As a “Provider”, Plaintiff was and is a licensed
 18 therapist, providing therapeutic services on behalf of Defendants for their customers
 19 who sign up for therapeutic services via Defendants’ online platform at
 20 www.getcerebral.com.

21 Plaintiff filed this combined wage and hour class action and PAGA action,
 22 alleging that Defendant violated California labor laws by failing to pay wages for all
 23 hours worked, failing to timely pay wages (including vacation wages) to employees
 24 whose employment had terminated, failing to provide accurate itemized wage
 25 statements and to maintain accurate records, and failure to indemnify for business
 26 expenditures. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants violated the unfair
 27

28 ² All referenced to “Odenbreit Dec.” refer to ECF Dkt. No. 44 filed on February 6, 2023.

1 competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, *et seq.*), and the California Private
 2 Attorney Generals Act (“PAGA”). (The complaint is ECF Dkt. No. 1.) Defendant
 3 denies all allegations. Plaintiff brought this class action lawsuit on behalf of himself
 4 and all persons who were employed by Cerebral in California as a non-exempt
 5 employee with the job title of Associate Therapist, Care Counselor, Licensed
 6 Therapist (NE), Prescriber, Therapist Associate (NE) or Therapist Nonexempt all
 7 persons who were employed by Cerebral in California as a non-exempt employee
 8 with the job title of Associate Therapist, Care Counselor, Licensed Therapist (NE),
 9 Prescriber, Therapist Associate (NE) or Therapist Nonexempt (“Provider Class”);
 10 and all former employees of Cerebral who were either (a) employed by Cerebral in
 11 California as a salaried exempt employee on or after January 1, 2021; or (b)
 12 employed by Cerebral in California as a non-exempt employee on or after August
 13 15, 2021 and was classified as benefits eligible by Cerebral (“Vacation Class”) in
 14 the state of California from four (4) years prior to the commencement of this action
 15 through present. (Declaration of Katherine J. Odenbreit (“Odenbreit Decl.”), ¶3.)
 16 Plaintiff now seeks preliminary approval of the Class Action and PAGA Settlement
 17 Agreement (hereinafter “Agreement”), which will resolve this action in its entirety.
 18

If approved by the Court, the Settlement will create a gross settlement fund
 19 (hereinafter referred to as “Maximum Settlement Amount”) in the amount of three
 20 hundred fifty thousand dollars (\$350,000.00) for approximately three hundred
 21 ninety-four (394) Class Members. (Odenbreit Decl., ¶4.) The Maximum Settlement
 22 Amount includes payments made to Participating Class Members, payments to the
 23 Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”), settlement administration
 24 costs, awards of attorneys’ fees and expenses, and a service award to Plaintiff as set
 25 forth below. The proposed Settlement is non-reversionary. Class Members will not
 26 be required to submit claim forms in order to receive their share of the settlement
 27 proceeds. Pursuant to the terms of the Parties’ Settlement Agreement, Class
 28 Members will be provided with a court approved Notice describing the settlement

1 in detail, which will include each Class Member's anticipated share of the
2 settlement, premised on the Court's approval of administrative costs, attorneys' fees
3 and expenses, and Plaintiff's service award approved by the Court as requested
4 ("Class Notice"). (Odenbreit Dec., Ex. B.) Following receipt of the Class Notice,
5 the Class Members will have the option to "opt out" or elect not to participate in the
6 settlement. (Odenbreit Supp. Dec., Ex. E, ¶7.5.) If they do not affirmatively make
7 that election, then each remaining Class Member will receive a settlement check
8 after the "effective date" of the settlement is reached, following the Final Approval
9 of the Settlement.

10 The Parties' settlement was reached after an all-day, arms-length mediation
11 with experienced wage and hour mediator, Hon. Jay Gandhi (Ret.). (Odenbreit Dec.,
12 ¶11.) Information exchanged prior to the mediation included redacted wage and
13 hour information, time for approximately 50% of the Provider Class, appointment
14 schedules, pay records, employee handbooks, and other policies. Expert analysis
15 was used by both sides during the mediation based on the time and payroll records
16 exchanged. The Parties disagreed extensively on the theories and data involved in
17 the litigation and the mediation went well into the early evening. (Odenbreit Dec.,
18 ¶11.) The settlement reached between the Parties takes into account the expense,
19 complexity of continued litigation and risk that certification may not be granted and,
20 if so, that it may not be maintained under principles outlined by the U.S. Supreme
21 Court in *Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011). In addition, the
22 Parties' proposed settlement accounts for Defendants' affirmative defenses, which,
23 if Defendants were successful would result in Plaintiff and class members receiving
24 nothing.

25 The Parties finalized a "Memorandum of Understanding" containing the
26 material terms of the Settlement on or around December 21, 2022. ("Settlement
27 Agreement") (Odenbreit Dec., Ex. A.) On January 12, 2023, Plaintiff's counsel sent
28 to Cerebral's counsel a long-form settlement agreement. After more than three

1 weeks of numerous unsuccessful emails and telephone calls by counsel for Plaintiff
 2 to get feedback from Defendants' counsel with regarding to the long-form
 3 agreement, as of this writing counsel for Defendants have not sent any proposed
 4 changes, and thus a long-form settlement agreement could not be finalized by the
 5 deadline set by the Court to file this motion. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶5, Exhibit D.)
 6 Plaintiff submits this motion for approval of the Memorandum of Settlement signed
 7 by all parties and will supplement or amend accordingly if Defendant sends its
 8 proposed changes to Plaintiff's draft of a long-form agreement within a sufficient
 9 time and the Parties are able to agree on the terms of long-form agreement. The
 10 long-form Settlement Agreement was finalized in early May and is hereby
 11 submitted as Exhibit E to the Supplemental Declaration of Katherine J. Odenbreit.

12 Plaintiff therefore requests that the Court grant this Motion for Preliminary
 13 Approval of Class Action Settlement, approve the Notice Packet to Settlement Class
 14 Members, appoint Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions as the Class
 15 Administrator, and schedule a Final Approval Hearing. Defendants do not oppose
 16 this request. Plaintiff further requests that this Court provisionally certify a
 17 settlement class for settlement purposes only. Plaintiff asserts that provisional
 18 certification is appropriate because the proposed class is ascertainable, common
 19 questions of law and fact predominate over any individualized questions, Plaintiff's
 20 claims are typical of those of the Stipulated Class Members, Plaintiff and his
 21 counsel can adequately represent the Class Members, and proceeding as a class
 22 action is a superior means of resolving this dispute.

23 II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

24 A. The Parties

25 Defendant South Lemon is a Florida medical corporation that provides
 26 "expert help [] for emotional health", including "help for anxiety, depression,
 27 insomnia and ADHD." (<https://getcerebral.com>). South Lemon provides an online
 28 platform in which it delivers services such as online prescriber visits, care counseling

1 and prescription delivery. (*Id.*) South Lemon employs licensed therapists and care
 2 counselors who provide counseling and/or therapy to clients. South Lemon's
 3 principal office is located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and is the entity whose address
 4 and name appeared on Plaintiff's wage statements.

5 Cerebral APC is a California corporation that is in the medical business and
 6 has the same officers and directors as South Lemon.

7 Defendants claim that only South Lemon is the proper Defendant in this case
 8 as it was Plaintiff's and the Provider Class Members' "employer" during the priod
 9 of four years prior to the filing of Plaintiff's complaint to the present. Plaintiff
 10 maintains that both Defendants were Plaintiff's and the Provider Class employers
 11 during the relevant time period.

12 Plaintiff and the Provider Class Members worked for Defendants as non-
 13 exempt employees with the job title of Associate Therapist, Care Counselor,
 14 Licensed Therapist (NE), Prescriber, Therapist Associate (NE) or Therapist
 15 Nonexempt. Plaintiff is a licensed therapist in the State of California. Vacation
 16 Class Members consist of all former employees of Cerebral who were either (a)
 17 employed by Cerebral in California as a salaried exempt employee on or after
 18 January 1, 2021; or (b) employed by Cerebral in California as a non-exempt
 19 employee on or after August 15, 2021 and was classified as benefits eligible by
 20 Cerebral.

21 B. Procedural History and Plaintiff's Claims

22 On December 10, 2021, Plaintiff, a former employee of Defendants, filed the
 23 Class Action in the California Northern District Court. Plaintiff alleged that
 24 Defendants (1) failed to pay all wages, including minimum wages for all hours
 25 worked; (2) failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements and maintain
 26 accurate records; (3) failed to pay wages upon termination of employment including
 27 accrued vacation wages; (4) failed to reimburse necessary business expenses and
 28 (5) engaged in unfair business practices. (ECF Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff sought recovery

1 under the California Labor Code, the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission
 2 Wage Order, and the California Business & Professions Code.

3 Originally Plaintiff also named as a Defendant Sequoia One PEO, LLC. After
 4 meeting and conferring with Sequoia One's counsel, Plaintiff's counsel determined
 5 Sequoia One was not an "employer" of Plaintiff and the putative class and dismissed
 6 Sequoia One from the action. (ECF Dkt. No. 12.) On April 1, 2022, Defendants
 7 Cerebral Medical Group, PC and Cerebral Medical Group, PA fka South Lemon
 8 Provider Group, PA filed an Answer to the complaint. (ECF Dkt. No. 27.)

9 Plaintiff contends that Defendants willfully failed to make or keep accurate
 10 payroll records for Plaintiff and Class Members because they did not accurately
 11 reflect the hours worked due to the alleged unpaid time spent for writing patient
 12 notes, attending meetings and waiting for appointments. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶6.)
 13 Cerebral maintained a policy of allowing patients to schedule appointments with 3
 14 hours' notice. When Provider Class Members were scheduled to work, they would
 15 could be assigned additional appointments which required them to constantly check
 16 their appointment schedule throughout the day. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶6.) This
 17 prevented Plaintiff and Provider Class Members from the ability to leave their
 18 homes for a significant period of time or engage in extended non-work activities.
 19 (Odenbreit Dec., ¶6.) Plaintiff and Provider Class Members were prohibited from
 20 recording this time as time worked. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶6.)

21 Plaintiff also contends Defendants implemented and maintained an unlawful
 22 vacation policy which required the forfeiture of unused vacation wages upon
 23 separation of employment. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶7.) On or around January 1, 2021,
 24 Defendants implemented a "time away from work" policy which allowed Plaintiffs
 25 and Vacation Class Members to take time away from work as needed, but required
 26 pre-approval and appeared to limit employees to 2 weeks at any one time.
 27 (Odenbreit Dec., ¶7.) Initially the program was only offered to Provider Class
 28 Members but was expanded on August 15, 2021 to all of Defendants' "benefits

1 eligible” employees. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶7.) Further, Plaintiff contends that
 2 employees subject to this policy were still required to maintain a minimal level of
 3 availability and as such, the time away from work policy was somewhat illusory.
 4 (Odenbreit Dec., ¶7.) As such, Plaintiff contends Defendants were required to pay
 5 all vested vacation wages to the Vacation Class Members upon separation of
 6 employment. *Minnick v. Automotive Creations, Inc.* (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1000,
 7 1007, *citing Suastez v. Plastic Dress-Up Co.* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 774; *McPherson v.*
 8 *EF Intercultural Foundation, Inc.* (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 243, 263–366.)

9 Plaintiff also contends Defendants failed to reimburse Provider Class
 10 Members for necessary business expenditures incurred as a direct consequence of
 11 the discharge of their work duties in violation of Labor Code section 2802.
 12 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges he and the Provider Class worked remotely through
 13 Defendants’ online platform used to access the Defendants’ appointment
 14 scheduling system, conduct therapy appointments and communicate with
 15 Defendants and peers. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶8.) This required the Plaintiff and Provider
 16 Class to utilize their own internet service and personal cellular phones to conduct
 17 work. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶8.) Defendants did not reimburse Plaintiff and Provider
 18 Class Members for these expenses. *Cochran v. Schwan’s Home Service, Inc.* (2014)
 19 229 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1144.)

20 Plaintiff contends that by failing to include in the final paychecks to former
 21 employees all vacation wages and by failing to include time worked by Provider
 22 Class Members for which they were not paid Defendants violated Labor Code
 23 sections 201 and 202. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶9.) Plaintiff further contends that
 24 Defendants failed to pay penalties for each day a former employee was not paid
 25 wages for all hours worked. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶9.) Defendants maintain that final
 26 paychecks, where applicable, included all wages, that they were not required to pay
 27 accrued vacation wages and that no penalties are due or payable.

28 /-/

1 Plaintiff also contends that Defendants willfully failed to make or keep
 2 accurate payroll records for Plaintiff and class members because they did not
 3 accurately reflect the hours worked due to Defendants' failure to allow Provider
 4 Class Members to record time worked waiting to be engaged for an appointment
 5 and for finalizing patient notes. (Odenbreit Dec. ¶ 10.) Defendants maintain that all
 6 records were maintained, were accurate and thus, no liability exists to Defendants
 7 on these claims. Plaintiff's claims for waiting time penalties and inaccurate wage
 8 statements contain certain risks as a result of their derivative nature. If Plaintiff
 9 was not successful in certifying a class for unpaid wages, based on other Court's
 10 decisions regarding statutory penalties under Lab. Code, § 203 (waiting time
 11 penalties) and 226 (inaccurate wage statement), they are not derivative of a
 12 successful claim for premium wages under Lab. Code, § 226.7. Pursuant to *Naranjo*
 13 v. *Spectrum Security Services, Inc.* (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 444, the meal and rest
 14 period violations are not a predicate for civil penalties for improper wage statements
 15 and untimely final wages under Lab. Code, § 201,-203, 226, 226.3, and 2699. (*Id.*)

16 Plaintiff sought civil penalties under PAGA for violations of Labor Code.
 17 As detailed in the Settlement Agreement the Parties are allocating Five Thousand
 18 Dollars (\$5,000.00) to the settlement of PAGA claims.

19 As Plaintiff's theories of liability are based on policies that apply to all non-
 20 exempt hourly employees and all benefit-eligible former employees subject to the
 21 Defendants' vacation policies, Plaintiff is confident class certification would be
 22 granted as to all causes of action. As discussed above, Defendants deny all liability.
 23 Defendants maintain that Settlement Class Members were paid all wages, subject to
 24 a lawful paid time off policy and were not required to reimburse expenses as required
 25 under California law. Defendants further contend that they have complied at all
 26 times with all applicable California laws, including the *California Labor Code*, the
 27 applicable California Wage Order(s), and the Unfair Competition Law. Defendants
 28 contends that if this action were to be litigated further, Defendants would have strong

1 defenses to class certification and on the merits.

2 On April 20, 2022, the Parties appeared at the Initial Case Management
 3 Conference. The Court set the motion for class certification to be heard on January
 4 19, 2023. (ECF Dkt. No. 32.)

5 Plaintiff promptly served written discovery. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶12.) The
 6 Parties were in the process of meeting and conferring about Defendants' responses
 7 to this discovery and Plaintiff initiated the process under L.R. 37-1 to file motions
 8 to compel further responses when the Parties agreed to attend mediation. (Odenbreit
 9 Dec., ¶12.)

10 **C. Mediation with Hon. Jay Gandhi**

11 On September 13, 2022, the Parties attended a full day of mediation with
 12 Hon. Jay Gandhi (Ret.), a well-known and experienced wage and hour class action
 13 mediator and retired United States District Court Magistrate Judge. (Odenbreit
 14 Dec., ¶11.) During the mediation the Parties fully explored and discussed with the
 15 mediator legal issues in the case, potential strengths and weaknesses on both sides
 16 and establishing class membership parameters. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶11.) The issues
 17 were hotly contested on both sides. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶11.) After a full day, the
 18 Parties agreed to the principal terms of this Settlement, which were subsequently
 19 formalized in a Memorandum of Understanding (“Settlement” or “Agreement”)
 20 (Odenbreit Dec.” Ex. A)

21 Prior to the mediation, the Parties engaged in informal discovery.
 22 Defendants provided to Plaintiff time and pay records for approximately half of the
 23 Provider Class and data related to the Vacation Class, Defendants' written policies
 24 and handbooks, and identified the number of employees comprising the putative
 25 class and aggrieved employees, as well as the relevant total workweeks and pay
 26 periods. (Odenbreit Dec. ¶ 12.) Using the aforementioned information and records,
 27 Plaintiff and his counsel consulted with an expert. (Odenbreit Dec. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff
 28 was able to reasonably assess liability on the part of Defendants and the resulting

1 value of damages, paving the way for the proposed settlement terms.

2 Based on Plaintiff's analysis of Plaintiff's Claims and Defendants' defenses,
 3 Plaintiff and his counsel determined that the agreed-upon sum of three hundred fifty
 4 thousand dollars (\$350,000.00) was a reasonable and appropriate gross settlement
 5 value for this instant action. (Odenbreit Dec. ¶¶ 27-36.)

6 **III. SUMMARY OF SETTLEMENT TERMS**

7 **A. Monetary Terms**

8 Pursuant to the settlement agreement, and in consideration for the releases of
 9 all claims at issue, Defendants agree to pay an amount not to exceed three hundred
 10 fifty thousand dollars (\$350,000.00) (the "Maximum Settlement Amount"),
 11 excluding Defendants' side of payroll taxes (which Defendants will pay separately),
 12 as a full and complete settlement of all claims arising from the action all Provider
 13 Class and Vacation Class Members. The Maximum Settlement Amount includes
 14 payments made to Participating Class Members, settlement administration costs,
 15 awards of attorneys' fees and expenses, the service award for Plaintiff, if approved,
 16 and payment to the LWDA. (Odenbreit Supp. Dec., Ex. E, ¶3.2.) The Settlement
 17 Agreement provides that the Gross Settlement Amount will be allocated as follows:

- 18 • Administration will be handled by Phoenix Class Action
 19 Administrators, a third-party settlement Administrator, and the cost of
 20 the Administration shall not exceed eight thousand dollars (\$8,000.00)
 21 and will be paid out of the Maximum Settlement Amount (Odenbreit
 22 Dec. ¶ 24; Odenbreit Supp. Dec., Exhibit E, Paragraphs 3.2.3 and 7.1);
- 23 • Defendants will not oppose an application for a class Representative
 24 Service Payment in the amount of five thousand dollars (\$5,000.00),
 25 to be paid out of the Maximum Settlement Amount (Odenbreit Supp.
 26 Dec. Exhibit E, Paragraph 3.2.1);
- 27 • Defendants will not oppose Class Counsel's application for a Class

1 Counsel Fees Award that is up to one hundred sixteen thousand six
 2 hundred fifty-five dollars (\$116,655.00), which is 33.33% of the
 3 Maximum Settlement Amount and Class Counsel Litigation Expenses
 4 not to exceed fifteen thousand dollars (\$15,000.00) (Odenbreit Supp.
 5 Dec. Exhibit E, Paragraph 3.2.2);

- 6 • Five Thousand Dollars (\$5,000.00) from the Maximum Settlement
 7 Amount to compromise of claims brought under the Private Attorneys
 8 General Act of 2004, California Labor Code section 2698 et seq.
 9 California Labor Code section 2699(i) requires that the parties
 10 distribute any settlement of PAGA claims as follows: 75% to the State
 11 of California's Labor Workforce Development Agency for
 12 enforcement of labor laws and education of employers; and 25% to
 13 "aggrieved employees." Accordingly, the Parties agree that Three
 14 Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars (\$3,750.00) of the LWDA
 15 PAGA Allocation will be paid to the Labor Workforce Development
 16 Agency from the Gross Settlement Fund by the Claims Administrator.
 17 The remaining One Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars (\$1,250.00)
 18 of the LWDA PAGA Allocation will be part of the Net Settlement
 19 Fund to be distributed in accordance with the terms of this Settlement.
 20 (Odenbreit Supp. Dec., Ex. E, ¶3.2.5.)

21 B. Settlement Class Members' Released Claims

22 As of the full funding of the Maximum Settlement Fund, Participating
 23 Settlement Class Member, unless he or she has properly elected to opt out of the
 24 Settlement hereby releases Defendants from the following claims for the entire
 25 Class Period (from December 10, 2017 up to and including September 28, 2022)
 26 upon final approval and funding of the Settlement by the Court, each Participating
 27 Class Member, together and individually, on their behalf and on behalf of their
 28 respective heirs, executors, estate and benefit plan administrators, and attorneys,

1 shall fully and forever release and discharge Released Parties from all claims based
 2 on the allegations of Defendants' conduct in paragraphs 20 through 28 of the
 3 Complaint in the Action (complaint filed December 10, 2021), and all claims for:
 4 (1) failure to pay wages for all hours worked; (2) failure to pay accrued and unused
 5 vacation time; (3) failure to keep accurate payroll records and provide accurate
 6 itemized wage statements; (4) failure to pay wages due during or at separation of
 7 employment; (5) failure to indemnify business expenses; (6) claims asserted
 8 through California Business & Professions Code sec. 17200 et. seq. based on the
 9 claims described in (1) through (5) above in this paragraph; (7) claims for statutory
 10 penalties based on the claims described in (1) through (6) above in this paragraph;
 11 (8) interest based on the claims described in (1) through (7) above in this paragraph;
 12 and (9) attorneys' fees and costs based on the claims described in (1) through (8)
 13 above in this paragraph. The claims released are limited to those that arose during
 14 the Class Period. (Odenbreit Supp. Dec., Ex. E, ¶5.3.)

15 **C. Aggrieved Employee Release**

16 As of the full funding of the Maximum Settlement Fund, Aggrieved Employee
 17 releases Defendants from the following claims for the entire PAGA Period (from
 18 October 5, 2020, up to and including September 28, 2022) upon final approval of
 19 the Settlement by the Court, each Eligible Aggrieved Employee, together and
 20 individually, on their behalf and on behalf of their respective heirs, executors,
 21 administrators, estate and benefit plan administrators, and attorneys, shall fully and
 22 forever release and discharge all the Released Parties from all claims for civil
 23 penalties under PAGA (the Labor Code Private Attorney General Act, California
 24 Labor Code §§ 2698, et. seq.) based on the allegations of Defendants' conduct in
 25 paragraphs 20 through 28 of the Complaint in the Action (complaint filed December
 26 10, 2021) or based on the claims that were specified in the letter Plaintiff sent to the
 27 LWDA on or about October 5, 2021 or in the Sixth Cause of Action in Plaintiff's
 28 Complaint in the Action, and all claims for civil penalties under PAGA for (1) failure

1 to pay wages for all hours worked; (2) failure to pay accrued and unused vacation
 2 time; (3) failure to keep accurate payroll records and provide accurate itemized wage
 3 statements; (4) failure to pay wages due during or at separation of employment; (5)
 4 failure to indemnify business expenses. The release of the PAGA Claims is effective,
 5 regardless of whether the Eligible Aggrieved Employee submits a timely and valid
 6 request to exclude him or herself from this Settlement. The claims released are
 7 limited to those that arose during the PAGA Period. (Odenbreit Supp. Dec., Ex. E,
 8 ¶5.4.)

9 **IV. CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION FOR SETTLEMENT 10 PURPOSES IS APPROPRIATE**

11 The Parties have stipulated that the court may, for settlement purposes only,
 12 certify a Settlement Class. A proposed class may be conditionally certified if it
 13 “satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
 14 applicable to all class actions, namely: (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3)
 15 typicality, and (4) adequacy of representation. (*Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.* 150
 16 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998).) The party seeking certification of a proposed
 17 settlement class must also show that the action falls within one of the three
 18 subsections of Rule 23(b) relating to predominance of common questions and
 19 superiority of the class action mechanism. All of the requirements of Rule 23(a) and
 20 23(b) are met here.

21 **A. Numerosity**

22 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (a)(1) requires that the class is so
 23 numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Numerosity does not
 24 require that joinder of all Members be impossible, but only that joinder be
 25 impracticable. (*Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. 1994) 158
 26 F.R.D. 439, 440.) In this matter, the Settlement Class includes approximately 959
 27 current and former employees, and therefore, numerosity is easily established. In
 28 this case, the Parties estimate there are approximately 394 settlement Class

1 Members. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶13.) Given the common issues of law and fact present
 2 in the case, numerosity is satisfied.

3 Additionally, the proposed class must be ascertainable, and must identify, “a
 4 distinct group of plaintiffs whose members can be identified with particularity.”
 5 (*Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc.* (9th Cir. 1978) 582 F.2d 507, 512.) Here,
 6 the members of the proposed class can easily be identified through Defendants’ own
 7 timekeeping, payroll records and other employment records. Therefore, the
 8 settlement class is both sufficiently numerous and ascertainable.

9 **B. Common Issues of Law and Fact**

10 The commonality requirement is met if there are questions of law and fact
 11 common to the class. (See *Hanlon, supra*, 150 F.3d at p. 1019 (“The existence of
 12 shared legal issues with divergent legal factual predicates is sufficient, as is a
 13 common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the
 14 class”).) Here, Plaintiff maintains that common factual and legal issues include,
 15 among other things: (1) whether Defendants engaged in a common course of failing
 16 to compensate Provider Class employees for all hours worked, 2) whether Provider
 17 Class employees were not reimbursed for necessary business expenses; (3) whether
 18 Defendant’s vacation policy required the payment of accrued vacation to former
 19 employees at time of separation of employment, and (4) whether these alleged
 20 violations resulted in ancillary violations of Labor Code, § 203, and 226, as well
 21 whether they justify penalties under PAGA and support the basis for relief under
 22 the UCL. Defendant does not oppose these contentions for the purpose of this
 23 Settlement only. Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that all Class Members suffer from,
 24 and seek redress for, the same alleged injuries. Similarly, Defendants do not oppose
 25 these contentions for the purpose of this settlement only. Under these specific
 26 circumstances, Plaintiff maintains that the commonality requirement is satisfied.
 27 (See *Id.* at p. 1019–20.) Further, the Ninth Circuit has held that commonality exists
 28 “where the lawsuit challenges a system-wide practice or policy that affects all of

1 the putative class members.” *Armstrong v. Davis* (9th Cir. 2001) 275 F.3d 849, 868.
 2 Therefore, to satisfy the commonality requirement, the claims must depend upon a
 3 common contention that “must be of such a nature that it is capable of class wide
 4 resolution - which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an
 5 issue that is central to the validity of each one of those claims in one stroke.” *Dukes*,
 6 *supra*, 131 S.Ct. at 2551.

7 Plaintiff alleges that all claims in this Action are based on common, class-
 8 wide policies and procedures, and that liability could accordingly be determined on
 9 a class-wide basis, without dependence on individual assessments of liability.
 10 *Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1033 (“Claims
 11 alleging that a uniform policy consistently applied to a group of employees is in
 12 violation of the wage and hour laws are of the sort routinely, and properly, found
 13 suitable for class treatment.) Accordingly, Plaintiff asserts that the answers to the
 14 aforementioned questions determine liability to all Class Members claims, wherein
 15 commonality is satisfied.

16 C. Typicality

17 The typicality requirement is met if the claims of the name representative is
 18 typical of those of the class, though “they need not be substantially identical.” (See
 19 *Hanlon, supra*, 150 F.3d at p. 1020; *Classen v. Weller*, 145 Cal. App. 3d 27, 46-47
 20 (1983).) Courts have held that typicality and commonality requirements “tend to
 21 merge,” and a finding of commonality ordinarily will support a finding of typicality.
 22 (*General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon* (1982) 457 U.S. 147; *Wehner v.*
 23 *Syntex Corp.* (N.D. Cal. 1987) 117 F.R.D. 641, 644.) This requirement is
 24 “permissive” and requires only that the representative’s claims are reasonably
 25 related to those of the absent class members. *Rodriguez v. Hayes* (9th Cir. 2010)
 26 591 F.3d 1105, 1124. The permissive standard of typicality focuses on similarity
 27 between the legal theories of the proposed class representatives and the legal
 28 theories of those class members they seek to represent. See *Tibble v. Edison Intern.*

(9th Cir. 2013) 711 F.3d 1061, 1074. In deciding whether individual variations preclude typicality, the focus should be on the behavior of the defendants. *Day v. NLO* (S.D. Ohio 1994) 851 F.Supp. 869, 884; *Capitol People First v. State Dept. of Developmental Services* (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 676, 692–93. The typicality requirement is satisfied “whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct that is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether the other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.” *Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp.* (9th Cir. 1992) 976 F.2d 497, 508

In this case, Plaintiff alleges claims based on Defendant’s conduct and policies and practices applicable to all Class Members. (Declaration of Gregory Bendau (“Bendau Dec.”), ¶¶2-7.) Further, Plaintiff seeks the similar damages (i.e., unpaid wages, penalties, etc.) as other current and former employees. Therefore, Plaintiff asserts that typicality is easily met in this matter. Defendants do not oppose this assertion, for the purpose of this Settlement motion only.

D. Adequacy of Representation

The adequacy requirement is met if the class representative and class counsel have no interests adverse to the interests of the proposed class members and are committed to vigorously prosecuting the case on behalf of the class. (See *Hanlon, supra*, 150 F.3d at p. 1020; *McGhee v. Bank of America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 450–51.) Plaintiff’s counsel is experienced in wage and hour class litigation. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶¶14-21; Declaration of Ira Spiro (“Spiro Dec.”), ¶¶2, 6.) Plaintiff and his counsel have fairly and adequately represented the proposed settlement class and have vigorously prosecuted this action on behalf of the proposed settlement class. Plaintiff and his counsel do not have any claims or interests which conflict or are antagonistic to the class. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶¶22, 23; Spiro Dec., ¶3; Bendau Dec., ¶¶7-8.) The adequacy requirement is met where, as here, the class representative’s claims are sufficiently interrelated to and not antagonistic to the claims of the class. (*Hanlon, supra*, 150 F.3d at p. 1020.)

Therefore, Plaintiff maintains that the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) are met in this matter.

E. Conditional Certification Pursuant to FRCP 23(b)(3) is Appropriate as Common Questions Predominate

Under Fed. R. Civ. P 23(b)(3), a Plaintiff must demonstrate that common questions “predominate over any questions affecting only individual members” and that a class action is “superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. (Fed. Rules Civ.Proc., rule 23, 28 U.S.C.A.(b)(3).) This requirement is met in this instant matter. When assessing predominance and superiority, the Court may consider that the class will be certified for settlement purposes only. (*Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor* (1997) 521 U.S. 591, 620.) The manageability of trying the case as a class action is not a factor for a settlement-only class. (*Id.* at p. 620.)

As detailed above, Plaintiff maintains that his allegations against Defendant raises common questions about the policies of Defendant, and the class members' potential legal remedies are identical. Plaintiff asserts that the proposed class in this case is sufficiently cohesive because, for purposes of the Settlement only, the parties agree that all class members share a "common nucleus of facts and potential legal remedies," as was present in *Hanlon, supra*, 150 F.3d 1011, where the Ninth Circuit approved class certification under the standards set forth in *Amchem*. Plaintiff further asserts that the proposed Stipulated Class in this case is sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. See *Comcast Corp. v. Behrend* (2013) 569 U.S. 27. Thus, this class may be certified for settlement purposes. Furthermore, the proposed Settlement herein is "superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

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1 **V. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF THE SETTLEMENT IS**
 2 **WARRANTED**

3 To preliminarily approve a proposed class action settlement, Rule 23(e)(2)
 4 requires the Court to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable,
 5 and adequate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) In turn, review of a proposed settlement
 6 typically proceeds in two stages:

- 7 (1) The Court first conducts a preliminary fairness evaluation, and
 if the Court preliminarily approves the settlement as falling
 within the range of possible settlement approval, notice to the
 class is then disseminated and a “fairness” or final approval
 hearing is scheduled.
- 12 (2) A “formal fairness hearing,” or final settlement approval
 hearing, at which class members may be heard regarding the
 settlement, and at which evidence and argument concerning the
 fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the settlement is
 presented.

18 (Federal Judicial Center, *Manual for Complex Litigation*, § 21.632 (4th ed. 2004).)
 19 “The decision to [grant preliminary approval and] give notice of a proposed
 20 settlement to the class is an important event. It should be based on a solid record
 21 supporting the conclusion that the proposed settlement will likely earn final
 22 approval after notice and an opportunity to object.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 at Committee
 23 Notes on Rules – 2018 Amendment.

24 “To determine whether a settlement agreement meets these standards, a
 25 district court must consider a number of factors, including: the strength of plaintiffs’
 26 case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk
 27 of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the amount offered in
 28 settlement; the extent of discovery completed, and the stage of the proceedings; the

1 experience and views of counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and
 2 the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” *Staton v. Boeing Co.*
 3 (9th Cir. 2003) 327 F.3d 938, 959. “The relative degree of importance to be attached
 4 to any particular factor will depend upon and be dictated by the nature of the claim(s)
 5 advanced, the type(s) of relief sought, and the unique facts and circumstances
 6 presented by each individual case.” *Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com'n of*
 7 *City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 1982) 688 F.2d 615, 625. “It is the
 8 settlement taken as a whole, rather than the individual component parts, that must
 9 be examined for overall fairness,’ and ‘the settlement must stand or fall in its
 10 entirety.” *Staton, supra*, 327 F.3d at p. 960 (quoting *Hanlon, supra*, 150 F.3d at p.
 11 1026).

12 In addition to these factors, where “a settlement agreement is negotiated prior
 13 to formal class certification,” the Court must also satisfy itself that “the settlement
 14 is not the product of collusion among the negotiating parties.” *In re Bluetooth*
 15 *Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.*, 654 F.3d 935, 946-47 *In re Bluetooth Headset Products*
 16 *Liability Litigation* (9th Cir. 2011) 654 F.3d 935, 946–47. Accordingly, the Court
 17 must look for explicit collusion and “more subtle signs that class counsel have
 18 allowed pursuit of their own self-interests and that of certain class members to infect
 19 the negotiations.” *Id.* at p. 947. Such signs include (1) “when counsel receive a
 20 disproportionate distribution of the settlement,” (2) “when the parties negotiate a
 21 ‘clear sailing’ arrangement providing for the payment of attorneys' fees separate and
 22 apart from class funds,” and (3) “when the parties arrange for fees not awarded to
 23 revert to defendants rather than be added to the class fund.” *Id.*

24 At this preliminary stage, “a full fairness analysis is unnecessary.” *Munday v.*
 25 *Navy Fed. Credit Union No. 15-1629-JLS-KES*; 2016 WL 7655807, at *7 (C.D. Cal.
 26 Sept. 15, 2016). (“To determine whether preliminary approval is appropriate, the
 27 settlement need only be *potentially* fair, as the Court will make a final determination
 28 of its adequacy at the hearing on the Final Approval, after such time as any party has

1 had a chance to object and/or opt out.” *In re Tableware Antitrust Litigation* (N.D.
 2 Cal. 2007) 484 F.Supp.2d 1078, 1079 (internal citations and quotation marks
 3 omitted); *see also Acosta v. Trans Union, LLC* (C.D. Cal. 2007) 243 F.R.D. 377,
 4 386.

5 For the reasons provided below, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant
 6 preliminary approval of the Settlement.

7 **A. Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case and Risk, Complexity, and Likely
 8 Duration of Further Litigation**

9 “Settlement eliminates the risks inherent in certifying a class, prevailing at
 10 trial and notwithstanding any subsequent appeals, and it may provide the last
 11 opportunity for class members to obtain relief.” *Scott v. HSS, Inc.*, 2017 WL
 12 10378588 *8 (C.D.Cal. Apr. 11, 2017). Given the potential risks of further litigation,
 13 this factor weighs in favor of granting preliminary approval. *See National Rural*
 14 *Telecommunications Cooperative v. DIRECTV, Inc.* (C.D. Cal. 2004) 221 F.R.D.
 15 523, 526 [“In most situations, unless the settlement is clearly inadequate, its
 16 acceptance and approval are preferable to lengthy and expensive litigation with
 17 uncertain results.”]).

18 The Court must also take into account the potential risks if litigation were to
 19 proceed, including difficulties in calculating damages, unsettled or unclear law and
 20 difficulties in securing witnesses for trial. (*Mora v. Cal West Ag Services, Inc.* (E.D.
 21 Cal., May 13, 2019, No. 115CV01490LJOEPG) 2019 WL 2084725, at *5.) Further,
 22 the Court also must consider whether an action is anticipated to continue with
 23 vigorous litigation and lengthy challenges regarding the merits of the claims and that
 24 Defendant may prevail on their defenses. *Id.*

25 Plaintiff believes in the merits of this case and believes that he will prevail
 26 should the case proceed to certification and trial. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶ 25.) Plaintiff
 27 believes he can demonstrate Provider Class Members were performing work for
 28 which they were not paid at least minimum wage and that the time spent engaged to

1 wait for appointments is compensable. *See e.g.*, IWC Wage Order No. 4-2001,
 2 section 2(K); *see also Mendiola v. CPS Security Solutions, Inc.* (2015) 60 Cal.4th
 3 833, 841–42.

4 However, this case involves a relatively novel issue whereby Defendants'
 5 vacation policy may be interpreted as an “unlimited” paid time off policy. While
 6 Plaintiff views this as a common issue amenable to class treatment, Defendants'
 7 interpretation of the time away policy would likely be the subject of opposition to
 8 class certification and summary judgment. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶25.) Additionally,
 9 Defendant argues that Provider Class Members were able to engage in personal
 10 activities while waiting to see if additional appointments were added to their
 11 schedule. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶25.) Plaintiff contends they were not able to engage in
 12 certain commitments or activities due to the fact they only had 3 hours to prepare for
 13 and conduct an appointment added to their schedules and they could not anticipate
 14 or decline an added appointment. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶25.) These unresolved issues
 15 create additional risk of obtaining and maintaining certification.

16 Plaintiff’s PAGA claims and the civil penalties potentially able to be
 17 recovered are uncertain. Because the Court has the discretion to reduce the amount
 18 of penalties assessed based on certain enumerated criteria and courts have frequently
 19 reduce penalties significantly and in some cases, zero penalties have been awarded.
 20 Plaintiff also faces a challenge to the manageability of a PAGA trial. (Odenbreit
 21 Decl. ¶ 26.)

22 Despite the strengths of Plaintiffs’ case, Plaintiffs believe that the inherent
 23 risks, complexity, and costs of what has so far been a protracted litigation weighs in
 24 favor of preliminary approval of the Settlement. If litigation continued, these issues
 25 and more would be the subject of extensive motion practice likely before and after
 26 certification. Therefore, these factors weigh in favor of preliminary approval.

27 /-/

28 /-/

1 **B. Amount Offered in Settlement**

2 “To determine whether a settlement ‘falls within the range of possible
 3 approval,’ courts focus on ‘substantive fairness and adequacy’ and ‘consider
 4 plaintiffs’ expected recovery balanced against the value of the settlement offer.’”
 5 *Schuchardt v. Law Office of Rory W. Clark* (N.D. Cal., Jan. 20, 2016, No. 15-CV-
 6 01329-JSC) 2016 WL 232435, at *10 (quoting *Tableware, supra*, 484 F. Supp. 2d
 7 at 1080). “Immediate receipt of money through settlement, even if lower than what
 8 could potentially be achieved through ultimate success on the merits, has value to a
 9 class, especially when compared to risky and costly continued litigation.” *In re*
 10 *LinkedIn User Privacy Litigation* (N.D. Cal. 2015) 309 F.R.D. 573, 587. A
 11 settlement amount that is only a fraction of the potential recovery does not render a
 12 settlement inadequate or unfair per se. *In re Vizio, Inc., Consumer Privacy Litigation*
 13 (C.D. Cal., Jan. 4, 2019, No. 816ML02693JLSKES) 2019 WL 12966639, at *9; see
 14 also *In re Mego Financial Corp. Securities Litigation* (9th Cir. 2000) 213 F.3d 454,
 15 459.

16 Fairness of a settlement is not conditioned upon Plaintiffs having obtained
 17 the maximum amount Plaintiffs could have been awarded at trial, but rather,
 18 whether the settlement is reasonable under the totality of the relevant circumstances.
 19 As the 9th Circuit noted in *Linney v. Cellular Alaska Partnership* (9th Cir. 1998)
 20 151 F.3d 1234, 1242: “It is the very uncertainty of outcome in litigation and
 21 avoidance of wasteful and expensive litigation that induce consensual settlement.
 22 The proposed settlement is not judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure
 23 of what might have been achieved by the negotiators.”)

24 Here, Plaintiff was provided with the total workweeks worked collectively by
 25 the Provider Class, time and pay records, the total collective PAGA pay periods, the
 26 total number of Vacation Class Members and parameters for eligibility for the time
 27 away from work policy. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶27.) From this information, Plaintiff was
 28 able to obtain an expert analysis and damage model projecting the potential

maximum exposure in this case. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶¶28-35.) Significant revisions had to be made in the damage model as pre-mediation exchange of information and information revealed in mediation came to light. For example, the Vacation Class only consists of only 24 individuals who were benefit eligible under Defendants' time away from work policy as it only applied to full time employees. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶¶28-35.) Originally, Plaintiff had projected a significant number of employees would qualify. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶30.) Overall, Plaintiff estimates Class Members will receive approximately 11% of the reasonable estimated amount of recovery. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶38.) This is within the range of reasonableness to warrant preliminary approval. *See Singh v. Roadrunner Intermodal Svcs., LLC*, 2018 WL 242325 *7 (E.D.Cal. May 29, 2018) [approving 12% of estimated maximum damages]; *Ferrell v. Buckingham Property Management* (E.D. Cal., July 30, 2020, No. 119CV00332NONESAB) 2020 WL 4364647, at *2 [approving settlement amounting to 5.3% of estimated damages]; *Balderas v. Message Envy Franchising, LLC*, 2014 WL 3160945 *5 (N.D.Cal. July 21, 2014) [approving settlement amounting to 5% of total value].

C. Extent of Discovery Proceedings and Stage of the Proceedings

With regard to the extent of discovery, ““formal discovery is not a necessary ticket to the bargaining table.”” *Linney, supra*, 151 F.3d 1234, 1239 (quoting *In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation American Poultry* (5th Cir. 1982) 669 F.2d 228, 241). This factor requires the Court to evaluate whether “the parties have sufficient information to make an informed decision about the settlement.” *Linney, supra* at 1239. Discovery can formal or informal or both. *See In re Mego Financial Corp. Securities Litigation* 213 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 2000) [finding plaintiffs had sufficient information to make an informed decision about the settlement where formal discovery had not been completed but class counsel had conducted significant investigation, research and presented court with documentation supporting those services.]

1 Plaintiff maintains that this Settlement represents a significant guaranteed
 2 recovery for all the Participating Class Members. In advance of mediation,
 3 Defendants agreed to, and did, provide Plaintiff with informal discovery relating to
 4 the size and scope of the class, total work weeks in the class period, Provider Class
 5 Members' time records and pay records, and applicable employee handbooks
 6 containing Defendants' wage and hour policies. (Odenbreit Dec. ¶12.)

7 Here significant information regarding the potential claims and legal issues
 8 was investigated by Class Counsel before the case was even filed. (Odenbreit Dec.,
 9 ¶12.) The Parties also discussed extensively the claims, supporting evidence, and
 10 documents during the Rule 26(f) conference. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶11.) Prior to
 11 mediation, Class Counsel was provided with documents and data sufficient to
 12 engage an expert potential liability model. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶12.) Finally, additional
 13 legal issues, challenges and data were discussed and exchanged at mediation.
 14 (Odenbreit Dec., ¶11.) Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of preliminary
 15 approval.

16 **D. Experience and views of counsel**

17 “Parties represented by competent counsel are better positioned than courts to
 18 produce a settlement that fairly reflects the expected outcome of the litigation.” *In*
 19 *re Pacific Enterprises Securities Litigation* (9th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 373, 378. As a
 20 result, representation by competent counsel familiar with the law in the relevant area
 21 and with “the strengths and weaknesses of [the parties’] respective positions,
 22 suggests the reasonableness of the settlement.” *In re Immune Response Securities*
 23 *Litigation* (S.D. Cal. 2007) 497 F.Supp.2d 1166, 1174. “The recommendations of
 24 plaintiffs’ counsel should be given a presumption of reasonableness.” *In re*
 25 *Omnivision Technologies, Inc.* (N.D. Cal. 2008) 559 F.Supp.2d 1036, 1043. In fact,
 26 experienced counsel’s judgment in this respect carries considerable weight. *See*
 27 *National Rural Telecommunications Cooperative, supra*, 221 F.R.D. at p. 528.

28 /-/

1 The settlement negotiations were conducted by experienced class counsel who
 2 have been prosecuting this Action since its inception. (*See* Odenbreit Dec., ¶¶11, 12,
 3 14-21; Spiro Dec., ¶2.) Class counsel wholeheartedly endorses the settlement
 4 agreement as fair, reasonable, and adequate. (*Id.*) That endorsement is the product
 5 of arm's length negotiations for over a year guided by a respected former
 6 Magistrate Judge (Hon. Jay C. Gandhi [Ret.]) who is familiar with legal and
 7 discovery issues arising frequently in class actions. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶ 11.) The
 8 Court should therefore credit counsel's recommendation that the settlement warrants
 9 preliminary approval. *See Linney, supra*, 151 F.3d 1234 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 1997)
 10 1997 WL 450064, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 1997). In the opinion of Class Counsel,
 11 the Settlement is fair and reasonable. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶39.)

12 **E. Arm's length negotiation free from collusion**

13 When a class settlement is reached before class certification such as the case
 14 here, courts are "particularly vigilant" in searching for signs of collusion. *In re*
 15 *Bluetooth, supra*, 654 F.3d at 946-47. Courts must look for explicit collusion and
 16 "more subtle signs that class counsel have allowed pursuit of their own self-interests
 17 and that of certain class members to infect the negotiations." *Id.* at p. 947. Such signs
 18 include "when the parties arrange for fees not awarded to revert to defendants rather
 19 than be added to the class fund," disproportionate distributions of settlement funds
 20 to counsel, and clear-sailing arrangements, none of which exist here (*Id.*) Although
 21 the "proposed settlement need not be ideal", it "must be fair, free of collision, [and]
 22 consistent with counsel's fiduciary obligations to the class." *Rollins v. Dignity*
 23 *Health*, 336 F.R.D. 456, 461 (N.D.Cal. 2020). The involvement of a mediator is
 24 evidence the negotiations were conducted at arms' length. *Joh v. American Income*
 25 *Life Ins. Co.*, 2020 WL 109067 *7 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 9, 2020).

26 The Parties negotiated this settlement in an all-day mediation with an
 27 experienced mediator. Subsequently, the Parties negotiated the agreement over
 28 months, discussing at length language within the agreement and its potential impact

1 on the class. (Odenbreit Dec., ¶12.) This factor weighs in favor of approval.

2 Accordingly, Plaintiff's counsel's opinion is that this settlement is a fair,
 3 adequate, and reasonable resolution of the claims in this lawsuit. (Odenbreit Dec.
 4 ¶39.) Defendants agree that certification and approval of this settlement is
 5 appropriate as a means to avoid the cost of further litigation, to avoid the disruption
 6 to its business and employees associated with litigation, to avoid the disruption of
 7 its business relationships, and to efficiently end the litigation.

8 **VII. THE PROPOSED NOTICE IS APPROPRIATE AND
 9 SATISFIES DUE PROCESS**

10 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(e)(1)(B) provides that “[t]he court must
 11 direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by
 12 the proposal.” “The best notice practicable under the circumstances, including
 13 individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort,”
 14 is required. (Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(2)(B).) The proposed Class Notice is attached as
 15 Exhibit B of Odenbreit Dec., filed concurrently herewith.

16 In this case, Plaintiff proposes that the Notice of the Settlement will be mailed
 17 via U.S. first-class mail to each Class Member's last known address. Defendant
 18 agrees to provide the Settlement Administrator, 15 business days following
 19 preliminary approval by this Court, a Class List compiled in good faith based on
 20 Defendant's records setting forth each Class Member's: (1) full name; (2) last
 21 known mailing address; (3) last known email address; (4) social security number;
 22 (5) an indication of whether the individual qualifies as a member of the Vacation
 23 Class, and; (6) total number of work weeks worked by Provider Class Members
 24 during the Class and PAGA Periods. (Odenbreit Supp. Dec., Ex. E, ¶7.4.1.) The
 25 Settlement Administrator will perform a search on the U.S. Postal Service National
 26 Change of Address Database and update any addresses with any new information
 27 found regarding the location of Class Members. Within ten (10) business days of
 28 receiving the Class List, the Settlement Administrator will send via first class mail

1 the Court-approved Notice of Settlement to each Class Member. (Odenbreit Dec.,
 2 Ex. A, ¶7.4.2.) If a Notice of Settlement is returned because of an undeliverable
 3 address, the Settlement Administrator will conduct a skip trace to locate a current
 4 address. (Odenbreit Supp. Dec., Ex. E, ¶7.4.3.)

5 The proposed Notice of Settlement provides information on the meaning and
 6 nature of the proposed Class; the terms and provisions of the Settlement; the relief
 7 the Settlement will provide to Participating Class Members; the applications of
 8 Plaintiff for his Service Award and of Class Counsel for their attorneys' fees and
 9 expenses; the payment to the LWDA of its share of the PAGA Award; the payment
 10 of the Settlement Administration Costs; the date, time and place of the final
 11 settlement approval hearing; and the procedure and deadlines for opting out of the
 12 Settlement or for submitting objections to the Settlement. If a Class Member
 13 chooses to object to the Settlement, they will have forty-five (45) days to submit to
 14 the Settlement Administrator an Objection to the Agreement. (Odenbreit Supp.
 15 Dec., Ex. E, ¶7.7.2.) Further, Class Members that choose to opt out of the settlement
 16 will have forty-five (45) days from the mailing of the Class Notice to a request to
 17 be excluded from the settlement. (Odenbreit Supp. Dec., Ex. E, ¶7.5.1.)

18 The Notice of Settlement also fulfills the requirement of neutrality in class
 19 notices. It summarizes the proceedings to date, and the terms and conditions of the
 20 Settlement, in an informative and coherent manner, in compliance with the
 21 Manual's statement that "the notice should be accurate, objective, and
 22 understandable to Class Members." (Odenbreit Dec., Ex. B.) The Notice of
 23 Settlement clearly states that the Settlement does not constitute an admission of
 24 liability by Defendant and recognizes that the Court has not ruled on the merits of
 25 the action. (Odenbreit Dec., Ex. B.) It also states that the final settlement approval
 26 decision has yet to be made. Accordingly, the Notice of Settlement complies with
 27 the standards of fairness, completeness, and neutrality required of a settlement class
 28 notice disseminated under authority of the Court. (See Fed. Rules Civ.Proc., rule

1 23, 28 U.S.C.A.(c)(2); 23(e).)

2 **VIII. A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING SHOULD BE SCHEDULED**

3 The last step in the settlement approval process is the formal final approval
 4 hearing, at which the Court may hear all evidence and argument necessary to
 5 evaluate the proposed settlement. At that hearing, proponents of the Settlement
 6 may explain and describe its terms and conditions and offer argument in support of
 7 Settlement approval; and Class Members or their counsel may be heard in support
 8 of or in opposition to the Settlement Agreement. The Parties propose that the final
 9 approval hearing be held on or after August 30, 2023, or a date thereafter convenient
 10 for the Court.

11 **IX. CONCLUSION**

12 For the foregoing reasons, the Parties respectfully request the Court make
 13 orders as to the following:

- 14 1. Certifying for settlement purposes only the following classes:
 - 15 a. Provider Class: All persons who were employed by Cerebral in
 California as a non-exempt employee with the job title of Associate
 Therapist, Care Counselor, Licensed Therapist (NE), Prescriber,
 Therapist Associate (NE) or Therapist Nonexempt from any time
 between December 10, 2017 and September 28, 2022
 - 16 b. Vacation Class: All former employees of Cerebral who were either
 - 17 a) employed by Cerebral in California as a salaried exempt
 employee on or after January 1, 2021; or b) employed by Cerebral
 in California as a non-exempt employee on or after August 15, 2021
 and was classified as benefits eligible by Cerebral at any time
 between August 15, 2021 and September 28, 2022;
- 26 2. Preliminarily approving the PAGA Settlement Amount;
- 27 3. Appointing Gregory Bendau as Class Representative for settlement
 28 purposes;

- 1 4. Appointing Plaintiff's Counsel, Katherine Odenbreit of MAHONEY
2 LAW GROUP, APC, and Ira Spiro, Attorney at Law as Class Counsel
3 for settlement purposes;
- 4 5. Approving Phoenix Class Action Administrators as Settlement
5 Administrator;
- 6 6. Approving the form and content of the Class Notice, and directing the
7 mailing of same;
- 8 7. Approving the opt-out and objection procedures provided in the
9 Settlement Agreement and set forth in the Notice of Settlement;
- 10 8. Directing Defendants to furnish the Settlement Administrator within
11 fifteen (15) business days after the Court grants preliminary approval
12 of the Settlement the Class List, as defined in the Settlement
13 Agreement, which shall be compiled in good faith from Defendant'
14 records to include for each Class Member: (a) full name; (b) last known
15 mailing address; (c) last known email address; (d) social security
16 number; (e) whether the individual qualifies for the Vacation Class
17 during the Class and PAGA Periods, and (f) the total workweeks
18 worked by each member of the Settlement Class during the Class
19 Period and PAGA Periods.
- 20 9. Setting a Final Approval Hearing.

21 Date: May 1, 2023

22 By: Katherine J. Odenbreit

23 **MAHONEY LAW GROUP, APC**
24 **IRA SPIRO, ATTORNEY AT LAW**
25 Kevin Mahoney
26 Katherine J. Odenbreit
27 Ira Spiro
28 Attorneys for Plaintiff, Gregory Bendau